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THE ISCIP ANALYST 
Volume 2, Number 11 (June 18, 1997) 
 
Russian Federation: Executive Branch 
By Susan Cavan 
 
PRESIDENCY 
Yel'tsin weighing options in Primorsky Krai 
Naming the local FSB chief as presidential representative in Primorye has 
apparently not led to a resolution of Kremlin disputes with the local governor, 
Yevgeni Nazdratenko. President Yel'tsin dispatched First Deputy Prime Minister 
Boris Nemtsov to the region to assess the situation and report back. In the wake 
of his visit, several options have been floated by members of the administration. 
 
Nemtsov held a meeting with Nazdratenko during which he suggested that both 
the governor and his main local rival, the mayor of Vladivostok Viktor Cherepkov, 
step down and hold new elections for their posts to allow "other people" to 
replace them. (RTR, 15 Jun 97) Nazdratenko later responded by agreeing with 
the idea of early elections and announcing his intention to stand as a candidate. 
(RTR, 16 Jun 97) 
 
While Yel'tsin has expressed support for early elections, his legal aide, Mikhail 
Krasnov, has also found constitutional justification for the president unilaterally to 
remove a governor from office. Citing Article 77's provision for a "unified system 
of executive power," Krasnov ignores the article's earlier statement that "The 
system of bodies of state power...is established ...independently in accordance 
with the fundamentals of the constitutional system of the Russian Federation...." 
Krasnov also referred to Article 80, which names the president as guarantor of 
the constitution. (RFE/RL Newsline,16 Jun 97) At the heart of this dispute is 
whether the president gave up his right to dismiss governors when he stopped 
appointing them and allowed for their election to office. 
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Other governors have entered the debate on this presidential right of dismissal. 
Konstantin Titov, governor of the Samara Oblast and leading member of 
Chernomyrdin's Our Home is Russia, has supported the administration's 
constitutional claims of a presidential prerogative to dismiss a governor. Eduard 
Rossel, governor of Sverdlovsk Oblast, has announced his firm opposition. 
 
Despite the importance of the constitutional issue at stake in this tug-of-war 
between the Kremlin and Primorsky governor, there are elements of personality 
and animosity that reveal a more intimate character to this matter. As Anatoli 
Chubais recently stated, Nazdratenko should be compelled to bear "personal 
responsibility" for problems in the krai. (Monitor, 16 Jun 97) 
 
APPARAT 
Advisory councils axed in budget crunch 
In apparent response to fiscal constraints, eight organs of the presidential 
apparat have been abolished or trimmed. Following the recommendations of a 
working group on reorganization established in September 1996, President 
Yel'tsin has issued an edict dissolving the following consultative organs: The 
Expert and Analysis Council; The Council for the Russian Language; the 
Coordinating Committee for Physical Culture, Sport and Tourism (once headed 
by presidential friend and tennis coach Shamil Tarpishchev); the Council of 
Heads of the Administration; the Council for Cossack Affairs; the Council for 
Scientific and Technical Policy; and the Expert Legal Council. In addition to the 
financial concerns cited for their dissolution, the duplication of authority among 
the many councils, long a feature of the Yel'tsin apparat, was also a factor in the 
reorganization. Without full text of the decree, it is difficult to determine whether 
this most recent restructuring has broader implications for the central members of 
the administration. (Rossiyskiye vesti, 27 May 97) 
 
SECURITY SERVICES 
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New FSB structure decreed 
The internal departmental structure of the Federal Security Service has been 
reorganized and ratified by presidential decree. While it is unclear who initiated 
this reorganization, media commentaries have suggested that the current 
leadership of the FSB was unaware of the effort until handed the decree. It is 
likely that former Moscow FSB chief and current deputy chief of the president's 
administration for personnel, Yevgeni Savostyanov, had some involvement in 
drafting the edict. The new departmental structure of the FSB is as follows: 
Counterintelligence Department; Anti-terrorism Department; Analysis, 
Forecasting, and Strategic Planning Department; Organizational and Personnel 
Work Department; Support Services Department; Investigation and Curtailment 
of Criminal Organization Activity Directorate; Investigations Directorate; 
Operational Search Directorate; Operational Technical Measures Directorate; 
Personal Security Directorate of Affairs; Detention Center; and the Scientific 
Research Center. (Rosssiyskaya gazeta, 29 May 97) 
 
GOVERNMENT 
Khrenov fired, magazine dissolved 
Yuri Khrenov, editor of the state-funded magazine Rossiyskaya federatsiya was 
fired in May after complaining about interference and rebukes from First Deputy 
Prime Minister Anatoli Chubais. While Khrenov claimed that Chubais' actions 
threatened a free press, Chubais retorted that Khrenov's removal had "nothing to 
do with freedom of the press." Chubais added however, "it is impossible to 
understand...a person who receives his salary from the government criticizing 
[the executive] in his publication." (RFE/RL Newsline, 12 Jun 97) 
 
Khrenov would not have had much job security however, even if he had retained 
his post. In a government decision last week, the magazine ceased publication. 
Financial constraints were cited as the cause for the government's action. 
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Russian Federation: Foreign Relations 
By Chandler Rosenberger 
 
Will the U.S. send peacekeepers to protect Caspian pipeline? Russia 
objects 
The Journal of Commerce reported on 5 June that the Clinton administration is 
considering sending troops to ensure the peace between Armenia and 
Azerbaijan. The report drew criticism from Moscow. 
 
Under the reported plan, troops from the United States would join European and 
Russian forces in overseeing a settlement over the Armenian enclave of 
Nagorno-Karabakh. The enclave is on Azeri territory but has been occupied by 
Armenian forces. 
 
A peace settlement in the enclave is crucial to successful construction of a 
pipeline for Caspian oil across Azerbaijan to Georgian ports on the 
Mediterranean Sea. The United States favors the route over an alternative 
through Russian territory. (Journal of Commerce, 5 Jun 97). 
 
Russian security expert Colonel Aleksey Gordeychuk objected that the insertion 
of U.S. troops would reduce Russia's influence in the region. (ITAR-TASS, 6 Jun 
97) 
 
Primakov condemns plans to keep NATO as basis of European security  
A NATO-based security system would "not suit Russia," according to Foreign 
Minister Yevgeni Primakov. Russia would rather see a new organization to be 
built upon the NATO-Russia accord, a Foreign Ministry spokesman quoting 
Primakov said. 
 
The comments came on 10 June as Primakov was attending a conference in 
Montreux, Switzerland. 
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The ideal security system, Primakov was quoted as saying, would be one in 
which "NATO, Russia, the United States and so on will all be playing a role and 
at the same time there will be none of that NATO- centrism." (Interfax, 10 Jun 97) 
 
A week later, British Prime Minister Tony Blair declared himself in favor of 
preserving NATO's leading role on the European continent. (Newshour, BBC 
World Service, 16 Jun 97). 
 
Nemtsov concludes visit to Japan; Tokyo supports WTO entry for Russia  
Russian Deputy Prime Minister Boris Nemtsov completed a three-day visit to 
Japan, during which the two nations agreed to pursue a number of economic 
projects. 
 
The Russian and Japanese governments signed agreements on the extraction of 
oil and gas from the Sakhalin shelf and on the revival of the trans-Siberian 
railroad. The Japanese also agreed to back Russia's membership in the Paris 
Creditors' Club. (Rossiyskiye vesti, 11 Jun 97). 
 
Nemtsov's Japanese hosts did not raise the issue of Russia's continued 
occupation of the Kuril Islands. Russia captured the islands at the end of World 
War II and has thus far refused to discuss returning them to Japan, despite 
significant pressure from Tokyo. Some Russian commentators feared that Tokyo 
would wait until the G-7 summit in Denver, to be held in July, before raising the 
issue. (Rossiyskiye vesti, 10 Jun 97) 
 
A week before Nemtsov's visit, Japanese foreign ministry officials announced 
that Tokyo would support Russia's application to join the World Trade 
Organization. Japan's support, however, would come only provided Russia 
opened up its market further to international trade. (ITAR-TASS, 3 Jun 97) 
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Comment 
Threats and bluffs over Caspian oil 
Now that Russia has secured concessions from the West on NATO expansion, 
securing a favorable Caspian oil route has risen to the top of Moscow's foreign 
policy agenda. Countries that must be destabilized are subject to new threats, 
while troublesome republics, such as Chechnya and Ingushetia, are wooed. 
 
Russia has, for example, attempted to disrupt peace talks between Georgian and 
Abkhaz leaders. Just as Georgian authorities were meeting anti-Russian Abkhaz 
leaders in Tbilisi, Moscow sponsored a "peace conference" that featured leaders 
of the pro-Russian, anti-Georgian forces in Abkhazia. As Pravda might have said, 
it is "no accident" that the two conferences fell on the same two days. 
 
A week later, Russian Prime Minister Viktor Chernomyrdin signed a 
memorandum with Chechen president Aslan Maskhadov to ensure the safe 
passage of Caspian oil through Chechnya on its way to the Russian port of 
Novorossiisk. The seriousness of Russian interest in the region can be measured 
by the recent promotion of Boris Agapov, the former Vice President of Ingushetia, 
to the post of Security Council Deputy Secretary. Agapov, according to Council 
Secretary Ivan Rybkin, will handle "emergency situations." 
 
The overtly imperial manner with which Russia pursues its national interests in 
the Caucasus makes White House plans to send in peacekeepers seem naive in 
the extreme. If, as the Journal of Commerce reported, the Clinton administration 
is seriously considering a joint Russian, European and American military 
engagement for the region, one must feel sorry for the U.S. troops to be 
dispatched. Their mission will be yet another hunt for historical ghosts, all too 
much like the American quelling of Balkan "ancient ethnic hatreds." The 
Russians, on the other hand, will have real, live human targets and a clear 
agenda. 
 
 7 
 
Russian Federation: Political Parties, Legislative 
Branch, and Media 
By Michael Thurman 
 
FEDERAL ASSEMBLY 
Federation Council speaker calls the Russia-NATO agreement "a 
diplomatic form" 
The main questions for Russia are the non-deployment of nuclear weapons in 
new member-countries and a guarantee that bases even for conventional 
weapons will not be deployed there. "If this is what was agreed upon at the 
Wednesday talks, Russia can join NATO itself and work in the alliance," Stroyev 
said. Does this mean eternal peace in Europe or a Russian veto in a security 
organization of which it is not a member? (Interfax, 14 May 97) 
 
Yel'tsin supports increased power of Federation Council 
Criticizing the Duma's legislative activity, the president expressed the view that 
the situation can be altered by enhancing the role of the Federation Council and 
its active participation in introducing order into lawmaking activities. The 
president believes the Federation Council should "make more exacting demands 
on laws coming from the State Duma." (ITAR-TASS, 14 May 97) 
 
This argument is not a new one, but fundamental constitutional changes would 
be required. It is unclear, and rather doubtful, if the Duma would sanction an 
institutional diminution of its already meager power. But playing inter-cameral 
favorites might help Yel'tsin prevent both houses of the Federal Assembly from 
ganging up on him. 
 
Presidential edict requires public officials to report their incomes 
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A draft decree prepared on the initiative of First Deputy Prime Minister Boris 
Nemtsov states that all persons taking official positions, including the president, 
members of the Cabinet, the Federation Council and the State Duma, officials in 
federal, regional and local self-government authorities agree to provide 
information about their incomes and property. 
 
Under the draft decree, the president must be handed summarized information 
about the declarations by 1 July. All state officials will bear accountability, going 
as far as facing dismissal, for failing to respect the deadline or turning in false 
information about their incomes and property. 
 
Income includes movables and real estate, including planes, helicopters, cutters 
or other sea or river transport vehicles. No word is made on limiting evasion or 
other creative accounting methods for public officials. (Interfax, 9 May 97). 
 
MEDIA 
Russian nationalities minister calls for more use of media 
Minister Vyacheslav Mikhailov said that, "the image of Russia and the history of 
our once common history presented in numerous CIS member states, in 
particular by their mass media, is distorted... If this goes on, Russia may find 
itself surrounded by hostile...countries." The solution is the creation of "balance" 
by broadcasting Russian opinion into the homes of CIS countries. It seems clear 
that the minister feels that local media are not capable of unbiased reporting. 
 
"Television programs should be exchanged on equal terms and a federal channel 
should be created on the basis of regional and zonal blocs. It could later become 
a CIS interstate channel," said Minister Mikhailov. (Interfax, 13 May 97) 
 
Russian Federation: Armed Forces 
By Lt. Col. Cathy Dreher and CDR John G. Steele 
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Government directive on nuclear power safety talks signed with Iran 
A government directive was signed in May stating that talks would be held 
between the Russian Federal Inspectorate for Nuclear and Radiation Safety and 
the Iranian Nuclear energy organization on cooperation in the field of safety 
regulation in the process of the peaceful use of nuclear power in the Islamic 
Republic of Iran. (Rossiyskaya gazeta, 10 Jun 97) 
 
Sergeyev on planned military reform 
Defense Minister Sergeyev is actively promoting his concept of military reform. 
Several interviews pieced together give a picture of what he is trying to do: 
 
(1) He believes "the most important thing is to remove shortcomings in budget 
financing of the armed forces." How does he intend to accomplish his goals? 
Personnel optimization is essential for reform, and having done so, "the burden 
to the budget of maintaining personnel will be eased," he said. At the moment the 
burden is unthinkable, the minister said. Over 60% of the money earmarked for 
the armed forces is spent on allowances, food and salaries. 
 
(2) He said it is extremely important to free resources and redirect them to 
research and design work so that the country will have models for a new 
generation of weapons and start serial production of them in five or seven years. 
Spending on control systems and officers assigned to monitor defense contracts 
at companies will be cut. He said that, at 40% of plants delivering equipment to 
the rocket forces, there are two such officials: one representing the Rocket 
Forces and the other the Space Forces. Such overlapping is unjustified, the 
minister said. 
 
(3) Another important task, he said, is to keep the combat-ready units which have 
an infrastructure, reliable equipment, and arms. On the basis of such units, 
Russia could have the military units of the future by 1998. To accomplish this he 
said optimization of the Strategic Rocket Forces and the Space Forces, a more 
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rational organization of the command, should increase deterrence efficiency by 
10-15%, as determined by independent experts. Optimization is not just 
sweeping personnel cuts. 
 
His overall plans call for restructuring the services from their current five down to 
three services. Not naming the future structures, Sergeyev reported that the 
planned defense reform will focus "on two components -- strategic forces of 
deterrence and general purpose troops." At present, Russia's armed forces 
comprise five services: strategic missile troops, ground troops, the navy, ABM, 
and air force. 
 
Meanwhile, Russian military experts have explained to Interfax that in the future 
Russia's armed forces will consist of air defense troops (ABM and air force 
included) general purpose troops (infantry and naval units included) and aero-
space troops (strategic missile and some ABM and air force elements included). 
(Interfax, 9,11,12 Jun 97) 
 
Ukraine moves towards NATO bid 
Ukraine appears to be moving slowly towards a bid for NATO membership. 
(Monitor, 9 Jun 97) 
 
Comment 
The Belarus/Russia "Union" treaty, as well as sovereignty issues in the Crimea, 
seem to be pushing Ukraine towards the West. NATO membership is perceived 
(by some Europeans) as a guarantee that the collapse of the Soviet Union is 
irreversible. Ukrainian membership in NATO would not be looked upon favorably 
by the Russians, but the Ukrainians may see it as the only long-term option to 
maintain their independence. 
 
Sergeyev's reform proposals earn presidential backing 
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Yel'tsin has given his blessing to early reform plans of General Igor Sergeyev. 
The plans (as yet rather vague) involve reorganization and some infrastructure 
reduction. They also include plans for four (ill-defined) "rapid-response/combined 
arms" formations ("units of the future") -- one to be stationed in the Far East, one 
in the north Caucasus and two near Moscow. (Monitor, 10 Jun 97; Reuters, 11 
Jun 97) 
 
Comment 
Actual cuts in force structure have proven politically difficult in the past. Any 
substantive decisions are bound to be political minefields. The location of these 
new units is interesting in that half this leading edge force will be stationed 
around Moscow, hundreds of miles from the nearest frontier (and threat, one 
would suppose). 
 
Suicide rate in services more than doubles 
The suicide rate in the Russian armed forces has more then doubled, from 15 
per 100,000 in 1991 to 36 per 100,000 now. (RFE/RL Newsline, Jun 97) 
 
Comment 
This is a very damming statistic, and it's not just hazed conscripts. Lately several 
officers have committed suicide, allegedly in protest over non-payment of wages 
and lack of career prospects. 
 
 
Newly Independent States: CIS 
By Mark Jones 
 
Interparliamentary Assembly meets in St. Petersburg 
A plenary session of the CIS Interparliamentary Assembly was held in St. 
Petersburg on 8 June 1997. The session was attended by delegations from all 
CIS member states except Uzbekistan and Turkmenistan-- the only CIS state 
 12 
which has not joined the Assembly. Ukrainian delegates participated as 
observers. The meeting was led by CIS Assembly Chairman and Head of the 
Council of Federation of Russia's Federal Assembly, Yegor Stroyev, and worked 
to sign some 15 documents concerning "important problems." According to ITAR-
TASS (8 Jun 97), the most heated debates were over three bills: on border 
troops, on state borders and on military training. 
 
CIS assembly, European Council's PACE sign agreement 
In a related story, Interfax reported on 9 June 1997 that a cooperation agreement 
was concluded between the CIS Interparliamentary Assembly and its European 
Council's counterpart PACE (Parliamentary Assembly of the Council of Europe). 
According to the document, the assemblies "will exchange ... documents 
including reports and other official papers so that they are fully updated on each 
other's activities." Yegor Stroyev was beaming about this agreement because he 
feels it provides a certain level of international legitimacy to the assembly. In his 
view a European organization is finally treating the commonwealth as an equal. 
Unfortunately for Mr. Stroyev, other events, including the signing of the Russia-
Belarus charter and other bilateral agreements as well as the progressive 
fractionalization of the CIS, continue to undermine the legitimacy of the 
commonwealth in international affairs. 
 
Peacekeeping proves fatal 
"Peacekeeping" duty proved fatal for 23 Russian soldiers in Georgia during the 
first week of June. Interfax reported on 3 June 1997 that a Russian armored 
vehicle carrying 13 peacekeepers was destroyed by a remote-controlled bomb. 
The fact that a remote-controlled device was used shows the attack was 
premeditated and the deaths were not the result of a simple accident. It may also 
indicate that the Abkhazians are making good on their threats to attack any 
soldiers who attempt to increase the size of the CIS-patrolled and -controlled 
peacekeeping zone. 
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Interfax also reported that, on 2 June 1997, a Russian sergeant on duty in 
Abkhazia shot and killed 10 of his colleagues and wounded three others. No 
motive was given, but the incident does not reflect a high state of morale among 
the peacekeepers. 
 
In a related story, Yusop Soslambekov, president of the Confederation of the 
Peoples of the Caucasus, said his organization is ready to send volunteers from 
the North Caucasus to the Georgian-Abkhaz conflict zone if the CIS 
peacekeeping force leaves. (Interfax, 10 Jun 97) 
 
CIS border troop commanders sign 13 cooperation documents 
CIS border troop commanders held a meeting chaired by the chief of the Russian 
Border Troops on 4 June 1997 and signed a number of cooperation documents. 
The key document was a draft agreement on cooperation among CIS border 
troops to "ensure efficient border controls with countries which are not CIS 
member states." The agreement will be presented for approval at the next Heads 
of State meeting. 
 
Other documents signed concerned measures "to enhance border cooperation, 
carry out special border guard operations Rubezh (Border) '97 and create an 
information network linking all CIS border troops." (ITAR-TASS, 4 Jun 97) 
 
CIS intelligence chiefs meet 
The Tbilisi newspaper Svobodnaya gruziya reported on 6 May 1997 that a 
meeting of directors of the security authorities and intelligence services of the 
CIS countries occurred in Georgia. Lieutenant General Shota Kviraia, minister of 
state security of Georgia, was elected to the office of chairman of the CIS Council 
of Secret Services. When asked what was discussed, LTG Kviraia was evasive --
"Our discussion was strictly confidential, professional, and top-secret. I can say 
just one thing. The main item on the agenda was the question of international 
terrorism and the interaction of the security authorities in combating it." Without 
 14 
noting further details of the top-secret meeting, it is interesting to point out that a 
Georgian was elected to chair an organization dedicated to CIS security matters. 
 
 
Newly Independent States: Caucasus 
By Miriam Lanskoy 
 
ARMENIA 
Oil pipeline to traverse Armenia? Armenian rights to Caspian reserves? 
Turkey's ambassador to Georgia, Tewfik Okiauz, gave a favorable assessment of 
constructing a pipeline from Azerbaijan to the Turkish port Ceyhan across 
Armenian territory. "There are no reasons why the oil pipeline could not run via 
Armenia. This is the cheapest and shortest route to Ceyhan and one fine day it 
will happen," he told Armenian journalists. The possibility of a "friendship 
pipeline" that would constitute part of the settlement of the Nagorno-Karabkh 
dispute has been occasionally broached in the past. However the latest 
Armenian effort to gain inclusion into the lucrative oil trade no longer rests on the 
premise of a Karabakh settlement nor does it presuppose Azerbaijani ownership 
of Caspian deposits. Rather, the Armenian parliament has moved to ratify the 
1982 UN Law of the Sea, under which, if the Caspian is a sea, "Armenia could 
demand of the coastal states transit for an outlet to it and could also seek to 
realize the right to joint exploitation of the natural marine resources as the 
common heritage of all humanity." (Interfaks-AiF, 19-25 May 97) At the same 
time, the foreign ministry is developing a proposal for inclusion in the group of 
maritime countries and participation in the oil development projects. Should 
Armenia become a participant in the group of five Caspian states, it will tip the 
balance in that group away from Kazakhstan, Azerbaijan and Turkmenistan and 
in favor of Armenia's allies -- Russia and Iran. If Armenia succeeds in its push for 
oil, it will have even fewer incentives to accommodate Azeri concerns in 
Nagorno-Karabakh. 
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No progress in OSCE negotiations 
The latest initiative on Nagorno-Karabakh presented by three OSCE Minsk group 
co-chairmen Valentin Lozinsky (Russia), Strobe Talbott (US), and Jacques Bleau 
(France) was rejected in Yerevan and Stepanakert. The Armenians rejected the 
principle of territorial integrity, as stated in reference to Nagorno-Karabakh at the 
OSCE Lisbon conference in the Fall of 1996. They continue to oppose any 
subordination of Nagorno-Karabkh to Azerbaijan. The details of the proposal 
were kept confidential. (ITAR- TASS, 31 May 97) 
 
Parliament passes Defense Law 
On 25 May a Defense Law that explicitly allows the stationing of foreign troops 
on Armenian territory was adopted by the Armenian parliament. (Interfax, 29 May 
97) Armenia already accommodates a Russian military base and, unlike Georgia, 
has given legitimacy to their presence. 
 
AZERBAIJAN 
IBRD studies cost of Baku port reconstruction 
The International Bank for Reconstruction and Development (IBRD) has 
estimated that the cost of modernizing Baku's dilapidated port facilities will be in 
the neighborhood of $52 million. It was announced that the terms and exact 
magnitude of the loan from the IBRD would be the subject of subsequent 
negotiations. One outstanding issue holding up the project is obtaining an 
accurate projection of the sea level in the Caspian. The Caspian has been 
subject to a great deal of dumping from coastal states and from military waste 
from the Volga river and has seen a steady rise in its sea level. A Danish firm has 
estimated that it will rise two meters over the next fifty years, which would flood 
the proposed port buildings and nearby facilities. Azerbaijani scientists believe 
that it will not rise by more than one meter. (Zerkalo, 7 Jun 97) Environmental 
factors such as the possibility of radioactive materials in some oil wells, the rise 
of the sea level, and the erosion of the sturgeon population pose environmental 
dilemmas and obstruct the oil projects already underway. 
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Aliev and Nazarbaev sign two memoranda on oil 
On June 11 President Heydar Aliev of Azerbaijan and President Nursultan 
Nazarbaev of Kazakhstan signed memoranda on cooperation in oil equipment 
construction and oil transport to world markets. According to the agreement 
Kazakh oil will travel by tanker to Baku, from there it will travel to Georgia's Black 
Sea coast and then to Bulgaria, Turkey and Ukraine. Eventually a pipeline under 
the Caspian can replace the tanker traffic there and connect to the other 
proposed pipeline routes. (Turan, 11 Jun 97) 
 
Kazakhstan has relied on Russia's Novorossiisk line, which besides its low 
capacity has sustained breaks, leaks and a general state of decay. This line has 
proven insufficient to deliver even half of the oil produced at Kazakhstan's Tengiz 
oil field to the market. The proposed route to Turkey, Ukraine and Bulgaria 
should alleviate the bottleneck at the Novorossiisk line. 
 
GEORGIA 
Russians signal willingness to pull out of Abkhazia 
Yel'tsin's press secretary Sergei Yastrezhembsky has stated that Russia may 
comply with Georgian demands to remove its peacekeepers. While commenting 
on Georgia's parliamentary resolution calling for the withdrawal of peacekeepers 
in August if they continue to fail to enforce their mandate, Yastrezhembsky said 
that the Georgian resolution "forces us to evaluate the utility of the continued 
presence of the peacekeepers in the conflict zone" (Nezavisimaya gazeta, 4 Jun 
97) 
 
This comment came on the heals of two fatal incidents in the conflict zone. On 1 
June a Russian peacekeeper killed ten of his colleagues and himself. On the 
following day a Russian APC was destroyed by a remote-controlled bomb, killing 
one and seriously wounding one of the 13 peacekeepers on board. 
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Tension in the conflict zone has been rising steadily over the last two months as 
the Abkhaz have opposed the implementation of the expanded peacekeeping 
mandate. Vladislav Ardzinba's visit to Moscow in early June, when he met with 
Yevgeni Primakov, did not bring about any evolution of Abkhazia's stand: On 9 
June Ardzinba proposed that Georgia and Abkhazia sign a peace treaty similar to 
the Chechen-Russian treaty, but refused to discuss particulars of the settlement 
until the economic sanctions imposed by the CIS against Abkhazia are eased. 
(Ekho Moskvy, 9 Jun 97) As a result, President Shevardnadze's recent 
conciliatory proposals (see last Digest) have not been met by similar Abkhaz 
moves. 
 
Recent statements from both sides contribute to the impression that a new wave 
of violence may be imminent if the peacekeepers withdraw. An Abkhaz 
representative has suggested that "peacekeepers" from the Confederation of the 
Peoples of the North Caucasus take over for the Russian presence. 
(Nezavisimaya gazeta, 5 Jun 97) This shadowy group was instrumental in 
delivering arms and mercenaries to the Abkhaz in 1992-1993 and was implicated 
in the December 1996 murder of Red Cross personnel in Chechnya. For its part, 
Georgia has announced that it will hold large-scale military exercises involving 
10,000 armed forces personnel in late June or early July. (ITAR-TASS, 11 Jun 
97) 
 
The Chechens, who aided Abkhazia in the past, have recently pledged to honor 
Georgia's territorial integrity. Ahmed Zakayev, a security aide for Maskhadov, 
characterized Georgia as "Chechnya's main strategic partner," and went on to 
say that "Chechnya cannot agree with the fact that the Abkhazian leadership is 
today obviously striving to strike an alliance with Russia to the detriment of 
general Caucasian interests." (ITAR-TASS, 3 Jun 97) This is not tantamount to a 
pledge to aid Georgia should war erupt. Nor have Georgia's other "strategic 
partners," Ukraine and Azerbaijan, announced any such commitment. Georgia 
may yet again find itself alone against Russia and its Abkhaz clients. 
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Newly Independent States: Central Asia 
By Monika Shepherd 
 
TAJIKISTAN 
Remainder of Sodirov's militia still under siege 
As of 13 April, Rezvon Sodirov and his three remaining supporters were still 
believed to be hiding in the Surkh Gorge, 80 km southeast of Dushanbe in the 
Vakhshskii Mountain Ridge (between the towns of Nurek and Rogun), although 
Sodirov and his men had not been spotted in three days. A Tajik military source 
refuted the rumor that Sodirov had managed to escape to Afghanistan or 
Kyrgyzstan, saying that the joint government-UTO force had sealed off all 
possible exits from the gorge. Presumably the reason that the troops had lost 
sight of Sodirov's group was that, due to heavy rains and the risk of landslides, 
search operations had been stalled for a few days. Furthermore, the troops had 
been instructed not to fire on the area where Sodirov was believed to be hiding, 
because Tajik government authorities wanted the men taken alive. The group 
was also known to be holding a local resident hostage to act as their guide 
(Interfax, 13 Apr 97), so perhaps the troops' reluctance to shoot was also partially 
out of concern for the man's safety. 
 
At the beginning of April there were rumors that Rezvon Sodirov and his younger 
brother Fathiddin (who was wounded by the joint government-UTO forces in 
March) had been killed, but Ghaffar Mirzoev, commander of the Tajik Presidential 
Guard (one of the government units involved in tracking Sodirov) flatly denied 
these rumors. Responding to another rumor, presidential press spokesman Zafar 
Saidov denied reports that Mirzoev had supplied Sodirov's group with a truckload 
of ammunition two weeks beforehand (Clandestine Voice of Free Tajikistan, 3 
Apr 97). 
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Comment 
Residents of a local village reported seeing Sodirov a few days before, close to 
the time that the troops lost sight of him, so perhaps the gorge was not sealed 
tightly enough. 
 
7th round of inter-Tajik peace talks postponed 
Opening ceremonies for the 7th round of inter-Tajik peace negotiations were held 
in Tehran on 9 April (IRNA, 9 Apr 97) but later that afternoon Akbar Turajonzoda, 
deputy leader of the UTO, informed journalists that the talks had been 
temporarily suspended due to the detention of 11 UTO members in Moscow. The 
UTO members were accused of having participated in terrorist actions against 
Russian military personnel serving in Tajikistan. Turajonzoda stated that the UTO 
wanted all charges against the men to be dropped, in accordance with the 
general amnesty that was to take effect in Tajikistan within the next month. 
Foreign Minister Talbak Nazarov, the head of the Tajik government delegation at 
the peace talks, denied any knowledge of the 11 UTO members' arrest (ITAR-
TASS, 9 Apr 97). 
 
On 10 April, UTO leader Said Abdullo Nuri issued a signed statement in which he 
blamed the Tajik government for the break in the peace negotiations. He 
accused the Tajik government of asking Moscow authorities to arrest the men 
(one of whom was a member of the UTO negotiating team) and labeled their 
action a "political provocation." He also charged the Tajik government with 
violating the 1995 Almaty cease-fire by executing two UTO supporters who were 
due to be released in the failed 7 April POW exchange (ITAR-TASS, 10 Apr 97). 
 
Maksim Peshkov, head of the Russian commission for Tajik settlement, 
responded to Nuri's statements by saying that only one UTO member was being 
detained by Moscow's law enforcement authorities, and that the man could not 
be released, based on the gravity of the charges against him (ITAR-TASS, 10 
Apr 97). 
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Nuri's next course of action was to order all UTO commanders to cease having 
any contact with representatives of the Tajik government (Clandestine Voice of 
Free Tajikistan, 11 Apr 97). 
 
On 16 April the peace negotiations resumed, only to be canceled again the 
following day. The peace talks were then rescheduled for 16 May, in Tehran, at 
which time the legalization of Tajikistan's opposition parties will be considered 
(ITAR-TASS, 18 Apr 97). Turajonzoda again made a statement in which he 
blamed the Tajik government for the negotiations' abrupt end, citing the arrest of 
the 11 UTO members, as well as the Tajik government's refusal to set a date for 
the legalization of the opposition parties as the two main reasons for the UTO's 
decision to postpone the negotiations. He also demanded that the 11 UTO 
supporters be released from prison and that the charges against them be 
dropped completely, before the negotiations resumed (Clandestine Voice of Free 
Tajikistan, 18 Apr 97). 
 
Comment 
Turajonzoda fears that the Tajik government is trying to shut the opposition, 
particularly the Islamic Renaissance Party, out of the government by limiting the 
opposition's political activities to such an extent that when new elections are held, 
most of the opposition candidates will have had so little time to gather support 
that they will win few if any seats in the new government. Turajonzoda seems to 
believe that the Tajik government is mainly interested in the military aspect of the 
peace agreements, which call for the UTO's forces to be disarmed and integrated 
into the government's armed forces. This is a legitimate concern, especially since 
the disarmament of the UTO's forces is to be completed long before new 
elections are held and could indeed deprive the UTO leaders of considerable 
leverage in the transitional government. 
 
UN to consider sending peacekeepers to Tajikistan 
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After a meeting with President Rahmonov on 21 April, Gerd Dietrich Merrem, the 
UN Secretary-General's Special Envoy to Tajikistan, told journalists that not only 
will the number of UN observers in Tajikistan be increased (at present there are 
45), but that the UN Security Council is to consider whether to send 
peacekeeping forces to Tajikistan at its next meeting in June. Merrem also said 
that General Franklin van Happen, the UN secretary-general's military adviser on 
peacekeeping, was in Dushanbe to hold discussions with representatives of the 
UTO and the Tajik government on ways of carrying out the military agreements 
that had been signed thus far. Should the Security Council decide to send UN 
peacekeeping troops to Tajikistan, it would most likely be in order to aid in the 
implementation of the military protocol which was signed in March (Radio 
Tajikistan Network, 22 Apr 97). 
 
President Rahmonov survives assassination attempt 
On 30 April, President Emomali Rahmonov was injured when a man threw a 
grenade at him in the city of Khujand (the administrative center of Leninobod 
Province in northern Tajikistan). Two people were killed in the attack and 49 
injured. Rahmonov was wounded in the leg. The man who threw the grenade, 
Firdaws Dustboboev, is rumored to have been one of the organizers of the May 
1996 anti-government demonstrations in Khujand. He was immediately taken into 
custody by local security forces (ITAR-TASS, 30 Apr 97). 
 
Abdunabi Sattorzoda, deputy leader of the UTO negotiating team, suggested that 
the attack on President Rahmonov might have been an act of retaliation for the 
government's recent crackdown on a riot in the Khujand prison during which 
more than 20 inmates were killed, including two of the riot's organizers (ITAR-
TASS, 30 Apr 97). 
 
The Khujand prison held at least 800 inmates (it was originally designed to hold 
only 300), 100 of whom seized control of the building to protest conditions in the 
prison. On 15 April they took four guards hostage and, in return for their release, 
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demanded that trials be granted to those inmates who had not yet been 
sentenced, that a number of ill and disabled inmates be released or hospitalized, 
and that the Ministry of Internal Affairs rescind its decision to transfer a number of 
the prisoners to southern Tajikistan, where prison conditions were rumored to be 
much worse (RFE/RL Newsline, Apr 97). Tajik authorities did attempt briefly to 
negotiate with the leaders of the prison takeover, but negotiations broke down 
quickly (Interfax, 21 Apr 97), and on 18 April special police units stormed the 
prison, killing 17-30 inmates, including two of the protest's leaders, Jamshed 
Abdushukurov and Ikrom Ashurov. Ashurov and many of the other inmates were 
political prisoners who had been incarcerated for the roles they played in the 
1996 anti-government demonstrations in Khujand (Clandestine Voice of Free 
Tajikistan, 18 Apr 97). 
 
The leaders of both the National Revival Bloc (led by former prime minister, 
Abdumalik Abdullojonov) and of the Democratic Party of Tajikistan condemned 
the Dushanbe government for the way in which it handled the prison protest 
(Clandestine Voice of Free Tajikistan, 23 Apr 97). 
 
Comment 
Abdumalik Abdullojonov's party has a fair amount of support in Khujand and also 
has good relations with the UTO. The Khujandis undoubtedly continue to hope 
that they will be able to regain at least some influence in the Tajik government. 
Abdullojonov has been lobbying for a voice on the National Reconciliation 
Commission and at first it seemed as though President Rahmonov was willing to 
grant the National Revival Bloc a few seats (which would have come out of the 
UTO's share of seats) on the commission, but he has since changed his mind. If 
the Khujandis are completely shut out of the transition government, "terrorist" 
attacks on President Rahmonov and his administration may well become a 
common phenomenon. 
 
Copyright Boston University Trustees 1997 
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